Introduction
All manifestations of political power eventually lead to questions about their legitimacy. Th e institutions of international human rights aspire to have power over governments and over individuals, and to the extent that they succeed the legitimacy of their authority is worth investigating. How and when can political authority be justifi ed as legitimate, and what consequences follow from it? Th ese questions are increasingly addressed to international law and organizations as a consequence of a perceived shift in the location of political power from the state to a more decentralized model of "governance without government" (Clark 2005; Hurd 2007 ; Lindseth 2010 ) .
1 Th e institutions of domestic democratic governance are widely credited with providing legitimacy to the modern state, and the transfer of political authority from democratic states to nondemocratic international rules or bodies reopens the legitimacy problem anew.
Human rights laws and courts have seen tremendous growth since the 1980s. Th e power of these institutions leads directly to inquiries into their fairness, their accountability, and their foundation, all of which are in some form questions about legitimacy. However, most discussion of the connection between human rights rules and legitimacy has focused on the particularly narrow question of how legitimation might increase compliance. In other words, what institutional arrangements might be made in order to increase state compliance with the set of desirable human rights obligations? Th is is a question of institutional design and it is at the heart of much of the recent literature at the intersection of international law and political science (Hafner-Burton, Victor, & Lupu 2012 ; Koremenos, Lipson, & Snidal 2003 ; Simmons 2009 ). 2 It operationalizes legitimacy as a causal factor that might change state behavior toward compliance, and then seeks to manipulate it as a variable in ways that will contribute to higher levels of compliance. Th is leads to debates over which set of human rights can be seen as legitimate, and what institutional arrangements are legitimate in order to realize them. 3 Th e pursuit of international human rights through international law is premised on the idea that legitimation of the rules or human-rights institutions is a step toward better compliance by states.
Th e crucial link behind such thinking is the supposition that widespread belief in the legitimacy of an international rule will lead to greater compliance with that rule. Th is is a conventional assumption in literature on legitimacy in international politics and law -Th omas Franck, for instance, includes compliance in the defi nition of a legitimate rule -and yet it gets little attention, either empirical or conceptual. 4 Th is paper gives some reason to question this view of the link between legitimation and compliance. It examines the practical life of the antitorture regime in recent years and shows how the Bush administration in the USA constructed a pro-torture practice inside the antitorture legal institutions. Th e antitorture rules have a high degree of international legitimacy but the case shows that this does not preclude rule-violation. Th e legitimacy of the rules does indeed shape state behavior, and so it is consequential, but these consequences are not measurable in terms of changing state behavior from violation to compliance. Th e politics of legitimation around torture are more complicated: the Bush administration used the antitorture regime, accepting its legitimacy, to justify and authorize a policy of torture . It constructed ambiguity in the regime in order to fi t its preferred policy within the rules. Th e legitimacy of the rules in the eyes of their audience was essential to making this work, since it shaped how violation was conducted and framed.
Th e problem that interests me is how legitimacy is conceived in social science scholarship. Legitimacy is widely defi ned in relation to rule 2 On the existence of a "compliance gap" at the heart of international law and organization, see Luck & Doyle ( 2004 ) . 3 On the fi rst, see for instance Benhabib ( 2008 ) , on the second see for instance Christiano ( 2011 ) . 4 Franck says, "A partial defi nition of legitimacy adapted to the international system could be formulated thus: a property of a rule or rule-making institution which itself exerts a pull towards compliance on those addressed normatively " (Franck 1990 : 16, emphasis in original) .
compliance, as either a socializing force that induces actors to comply with a rule (Hurd 2007 ) , or as a moral and psychological reason for an actor to choose to comply with a rule (Buchanan & Keohane 2006 ) , or as an infl uence on costs and benefi ts that makes compliance the rational, profitable choice (Voeten 2005 ) . Th ese approaches leave no room to understand a case where rules appear to be widely accepted as legitimate and are also subject to noncompliance by those who believe in their legitimacy. In other words, these approaches deny agents the capacity to think, act, and choose in the presence of a legitimated rule or norm. To understand the politics of legitimation in such a case requires decoupling legitimacy from compliance, and therefore requires rethinking how legitimacy relates to rules, interests, and state behavior. Th ese are the goals of this paper. I divide the argument into three sections. Th e fi rst examines the content of the legal regime against torture and its relevance to US behavior in the 2000s. Th is is largely contained in the Convention Against Torture (1984) and the Geneva Convention of 1949.
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I make a case that these rules have a high level of legitimacy in the international community, including in the US government. Given the unmeasurable nature of legitimacy this case can only be tentative, but I believe it is nonetheless strong and more plausible than any alternative. Th e second section then discusses US behavior toward these rules under George W. Bush, emphasizing the eff ort to fi t the practice of torture within the legal rules that forbid it. Th e legal arguments that they provided are elements in a politics of legitimation, and rest on the ability to use the rules instrumentally to legitimate a political choicethat is, it requires that legitimacy and agency exist simultaneously, and so cannot be understood in the conventional scholarly framing of legitimacy. Th e third section outlines an approach to international law and politics that can understand how legitimacy may coexist with rule-violation. States value being seen as complying with their international legal obligations, as evidenced by the widespread practice of using international legal arguments in public diplomacy. International law provides the resources out of which these justifi cations are made, and in this process it is inevitable that states will present competing and perhaps even irreconcilable understandings of the content of international law. Contested claims about compliance are endemic to international law, as they are to all law, and in the absence of a judicial institution they are likely to remain unresolved. Th e rule of law in world politics encompasses these controversies: states believe in the importance of rule-following even where they cannot agree on what actions constitute rule-following. In such a world, the power of the rules is evident in their use by states, independent of judgments regarding what constitutes compliance with them.
Torture in international humanitarian law
Th e universe of international human rights law and norms contains many prohibitions on torture. Th ese vary in their legal status from the hortatory to the compelling. Th e Universal Declaration of Human Rights includes the very clear statement that "no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" (Art. 5). Th is was repeated in, among other places, the American Convention on Human Rights of 1969 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1976. 6 Th ese are specifi c incarnations of the more general statement in the United Nations Charter that its member states "reaffi rm faith in fundamental human rights. " 7 However, none of these treaties frame their subject in terms of specifi c legal obligations that are binding on their signatories and so they are not of a type that can be complied with or violated -they describe what they see as the aspirations of the signatories.
Th e key documents for contemporary legal debate on torture are the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment (CAT), adopted in 1984 aft er negotiations in the UN General Assembly, and the Geneva Convention of 1949, particularly Article 3 on the treatment of people in non-international confl icts. Th e CAT defi nes torture as any act by which severe pain or suff ering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally infl icted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him … information or a confession, punishing him … or intimidating or coercing him …, when such pain or suff ering is infl icted by or at the instigation of … a public offi cial or other person acting in an offi cial capacity.
(Art. 1) It requires that signatory states "take eff ective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction" (Art. 2) and "ensure that all acts of torture are off enses under its criminal law" (Art. 4).
Th e Geneva Conventions of 1949 prohibit "violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture" (3rd, 3(i)a) and "outrages upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment" (3rd, 3(i)c). Th ese apply in cases of declared war among contracting parties (Art. 2) as well as in confl icts of a noninternational character (Art. 3). Th is is the set of treaties that includes the three earlier Geneva Conventions (of 1864, 1906, and 1929) and adds a fourth, and has been ratifi ed by every member of the United Nations -this makes it the centerpiece of international human rights law as it applies to behavior in the context of war and other armed confl ict.
Both documents are in the form of an inter-state treaty, which means that the obligations that each contains are legally binding on the states that accept it and are not legally relevant to any other state or any other kind of actor. Public international law has traditionally been understood as having only states as its subjects and does not regulate the conduct of individual persons (though pirates may be seen as holding special status under international law). Th is is relevant in this context because it means that there is a gap between the international prohibition of torture and the legal position of the individuals whose conduct is presumably ultimately of interest to the law. To get from a public international law commitment against torture to an obligation that is binding on individuals as such, whether private or public offi cials, requires a bridge from public international law to either domestic law or international criminal law.
For the Convention Against Torture, this bridge is provided by its Article 4. By requiring that torture be made a criminal off ense in the domestic law of its signatory states, the CAT exploits existing domestic legal regimes in order to impinge on the torturer as an individual. In this way, Article 4 of the CAT fi lls the legal gap between the domain of inter-state public international law and the regulation of the behavior of individual persons. For the Geneva Conventions, the gap is bridged by Article 1, which is common across all four of the conventions, and reads: "Th e High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances. " Th is again is done with domestic legislation and military codes of conduct binding on the states' military personnel.
Th e operation of this domestic implication was recently explained for the CAT in the 2012 decision of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the case of Belgium v. Senegal . 8 Th e Court decided that Senegal committed a harm to Belgium by not prosecuting Hiss è ne Habr é for crimes covered under the Torture convention. Habr é is the former president of Chad who has been living in Senegal for several years despite evidence of his responsibility for torture while in offi ce. Th e ICJ reached several interesting conclusions in its decision: fi rst, on jurisdiction, it found that the disagreement between Belgium and Senegal over how the CAT should be implemented was indeed a "legal dispute" and thus the Court's jurisdiction was activated; second, on substance, it found that Senegal's failure to act against Habr é amounted to a violation of its promises to other CAT signatory states; and fi nally, it found that Belgium, as one of these states, had its international legal rights harmed by that violation and so was in a position to bring the matter to the ICJ in a contentious case. Th e judgment demands that Senegal use its domestic criminal institutions to prosecute Habr é for torture, or that it extradite him in accordance with the CAT. Th e case shows the path by which the international obligation taken on by the government in signing the CAT is executed through changes in the domestic criminal codes, and also how this remains an international obligation over which the ICJ exercises oversight authority.
Other international human rights instruments can be compared on how they do or do not deal with this gap. Th e Genocide Convention, for instance, includes an obligation for domestic legal internalization. It requires that its States parties "enact, in accordance with their respective Constitutions, the necessary legislation to give eff ect to the provisions" of the Convention which criminalize genocide and set the terms for investigating and punishing those who commit it (Art. V). Th is puts the crime of genocide into the domestic criminal codes of all signatory states. Th e Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court is revolutionary because it relies on a very diff erent means to bridge between international law and domestic individuals: it creates a new kind of international legal authority with "jurisdiction over natural persons pursuant to this statute. " 9 Th e ICC treaty includes the promise by the States parties that they will consent to their citizens, as well as foreigners within their jurisdictions, being prosecuted by the ICC directly under certain conditions. Th is (arguably) amounts to a new category of public international law where the subject is an individual person rather than a state. Th e ICC and the CAT can be contrasted with other instruments in which no eff ort is made to bridge between states' obligations to each other and the legal standing of individuals. For instance, there is nothing in the UN Charter or the ICCPR or the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that requires that individuals refrain from, or be punished for, acts of torture -in each of these instruments, the commitment against torture is made as a promise (or an aspiration) of states inter se .
Th e bridge between international law on torture and US domestic law is accomplished in several ways. For the Geneva Convention, this is done with the War Crimes Act of 1996, which makes grave breaches of the Conventions into federal crimes. In the domain of torture more broadly, the formal language of "torture" is used in US criminal law only to refer to acts committed abroad, while much of the substantive behavior that the CAT is concerned with within the USA falls under the Eighth Amendment to the US Constitution. Th e Criminal Code defi nes torture as "an act committed by a person under the color of law specifically intended to infl ict severe pain and suff ering" (18 US C. §2340), when the act was committed abroad. When committed inside the USA, these acts fall under the constitutional prohibition on "cruel and unusual punishments." Th e same acts committed by private actors without any connection to the purposes of the state (i.e., without "color of law" or "an offi cial capacity") would be covered by general criminal laws against assault, murder, etc. Police brutality in Chicago, for instance, cannot be prosecuted as "torture" strictly speaking because it is domestic (Human Rights Watch 1998 ).
Th e antitorture regime represents an archetypal piece of traditional international law in the classical sense: these are explicit black-letter treaties that have eff ect as a result of state consent . It is relatively clear as treaty-law goes as it sets down what Liese considers to be a "nonderogable and absolute" prohibition (Liese 2009 : 21) . Th e purpose of these instruments is to induce compliance by government authorities, and they therefore fi t into a very traditional frame in the legal architecture in world politics: public international law in the inter-state model. Th ey are designed to change the costs and benefi ts that states face as they consider how they might use force against individuals in their custody, and specifi cally to increase the political costs of using torture. Th is is consistent with conventional accounts of the philosophy of international law, of how the international rule of law is generally understood, and with the "compliance model" of law in international relations.
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Th e rules are also clearly designed for a nonideal world: the CAT treaty anticipates that violations will occur and sets rules about states' responses to instances of torture.
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Most of its articles deal with the obligations of states when acts of torture are committed, either by their offi cials or against their citizens. Th ese are rules that are grounded in the practical realities of inter-state relations.
Th e legitimacy of these rules also seems well established. Even accepting that it is impossible to measure legitimacy in international society with any confi dence, several streams of evidence suggest that these rules are seen as highly legitimate by states and activists. For instance, both are among the most widely ratifi ed human rights instruments: the Geneva Convention by 194 jurisdictions and the Convention Against Torture by 147. And even groups that are not qualifi ed to ratify them (such as sub-state military forces) oft en make explicit statements about their commitment to the rules they contain -actors actively seek out affi liation with the rules, seeking no doubt some political legitimacy that they believe is attached to them.
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Th ere is little dissent from the idea that the rules are binding on the states that have accepted them and that they are both normatively and legally good; that is, they are accepted as important legal commitments by states, and they are endorsed as refl ecting normative progress in world politics.
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For instance, Louise Arbour, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, was likely speaking the majority opinion when she recently said that the "absolute ban on torture … [is] a cornerstone of the international human rights edifi ce. " 14 When controversies arise over torture in international law, it is generally focused on how to make governments follow them more faithfully rather than whether they should exist or not. Th ere is essentially no controversy over the rules themselves and no mobilization to abolish or limit them -all discussion is about their implementation, extension, or enforcement. Th e absence of controversy is unlikely to be "artifi cial" in the sense of being a result of either the exclusion of dissent 10 On the international rule of law, see Chesterman ( 2008 ) . On the "compliance model, " see Howse & Teitel ( 2010 ) . 11 See the introduction to this volume on the importance of nonideal theorizing of international human rights. 12 See for instance Interim Transitional National Council of Libya ( 2011 ) . 13 On antitorture rules as evidence of moral progress in world politics, see for instance Jolly, Emmerij, & Weiss ( 2009 by the imposition of political power or the fundamental irrelevance of the rules.
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Perhaps most telling among the evidence for the legitimation of an titorture laws is the fact that those who argue in favor of "coercive interrogation" or "exceptional measures" work hard to diff erentiate these from torture itself. Michael Ignatieff is representative of this position, with his argument that torture should be outlawed and (not "but") the government should be allowed to use coercive interrogation measures in certain circumstances or with special bureaucratic or political procedures (Forsythe 2011 : Ch. 7; Ignatieff 2004 ) . A diff erent route to what might be the same outcome is taken by Alan Dershowitz who argues that torture is rightly outlawed in international law but , since it continues to be practiced by states, we should require that it be used only according to certain bureaucratic or political procedures (i.e., warrants to permit torture must be obtained fi rst) so that the practice is accompanied by greater accountability (Dershowitz 2003 ) . Both arguments begin with strong statements in defense of the illegality of torture, even though their consequent claims either endorse it in practice or are premised on its continuation. Th is supports the conclusion that the ban on torture is very nearly universally endorsed. 16 All of these elements point to the conclusion that the obligations they contain are well legitimated among states, scholars, and activists, even if this conclusion can only be tentative and provisional.
Literature on legitimacy, and connection to compliance
Th e conventional understanding of legitimacy in social science would predict that this legitimacy should translate into faithful compliance with the rules. Th e scholarly literature maintains that legitimacy is naturally related to compliance: compliance is oft en modeled as a consequence of legitimacy (for instance , Hurd 2007 ; Voeten 2005 ) , and legitimacy is oft en sought as a mechanism for increasing compliance or for reducing opposition (for instance , Bjola 2005 ; Buchanan 2007 ). Th is is evident across the spectrum of scholarship, and originates in the sociological literature from which the 15 Th ese are noted in the introduction to this volume as possible reasons (alongside legitimacy) for why a rule might exist without controversy. 16 A case for its incompleteness could be premised on the following voices in US politics: New York Times ( 2011 ) . However, much of the debate in American political discourse is over whether specifi c practices such as waterboarding constitute torture or not, which is distinct from the question of whether torture itself is permissible.
IR literature is derived: it is present in Max Weber's view of legitimacy, in J ü rgen Habermas's model of communicative action, in John Gaventa's theory of acquiescence and social power, in consent theory, in democratic theory, and beyond. A rule that is legitimate is said to be more likely to induce compliance by actors. Th e legitimacy literature in IR arrives at this conclusion by two distinct paths, refl ecting competing visions of how to study legitimacy in social settings. A subjective tradition defi nes legitimacy as the belief by an individual that a rule or structure has rightful authority. Th is traces back to Max Weber's sociological theory of legitimacy, in a "descriptive" rather than "normative" attitude. It begins from the premise that legitimacy rests in the ideas held by an actor about their social surroundings. Th ese ideas may be shared among many in a community, but it is reducible to an individual belief: because individuals behave diff erently toward rules that they believe are legitimate, the existence of a belief about legitimate rule has important consequences for aggregate social and political systems.
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An objective tradition begins by asking what kinds of rules or structures are deserving of these beliefs, and it therefore posits external normative criteria, oft en derived from moral philosophy, to judge whether a rule or institution can be called legitimate. Common among these criteria are versions of democratic procedures or substantive goals such as fairness or respect for human rights. Th is view suggests that outside observers can judge the legitimacy of a rule by observing its content, or its genealogy, or its relationship to the governed.
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Th e subjective tradition has an affi nity with behavioral studies in social science, and focuses on how people (or states) behave in the face of political authorities that they believe to be legitimate (or illegitimate). Th e objective tradition has more in common with normative philosophy, and has the power to second-guess people's own beliefs about the legitimacy of the institutions around them. For instance, Tom Tyler, following the subjective tradition, investigates when and why people in the USA obey laws and decisions that do not favor them (Tyler 1990 ) . He fi nds that people are more likely to follow the law when they have faith in the legitimacy of the process that produced it. He does not ask whether these beliefs are justifi ed. By contrast, Allen Buchanan suggests that a government should only be considered legitimate when it meets certain standards for the treatment of its citizens, regardless of how the population feels about it (Buchanan 17 For instance, Gaventa ( 1982 ) on the behavioral consequences of the third face of power. 18 For instance, Doyle (2011) on when preemptive force should be considered legitimate.
2007
). Th is is characteristic of the objective approach -Buchanan posits a set of morally valuable criteria and then uses them to judge whether a government should count as legitimate.
Th e traditions coexist because each can illuminate the blind spots of the other. Th e objective approach is only as compelling as the moral criteria that it begins with, and these are endlessly contested in political philosophy. Th e subjective approach takes seriously people's beliefs about their political surroundings but provides no critical resources for assessing those beliefs; political leaders routinely try to legitimize their rule to their subjects, and they may succeed even if outsiders fi nd the regime abhorrent. Th e two therefore mean very diff erent things when they conclude that a rule or institution is legitimate, and these diff erences oft en keep the sides from talking clearly with each other.
Th ey agree, however, that compliance is naturally connected to legitimacy. Th e objective tradition suggests that agents have a moral or political reason to comply with legitimate rules (a "duty to obey"), while the subjective tradition fi nds empirical evidence that they in fact do comply with them more than rules without legitimacy. Conversely, rule-violation is in this view evidence of the absence of legitimacy. As Schaff er, F ø llesdal, and Ulfstein (this volume) note, "if a treaty … fails to secure its objective to a certain minimum extent, it risks losing normative legitimacy: individuals and other actors may no longer regard themselves as bound to comply. " Rules and institutions, it is said, lose their legitimacy and thus their power if they are routinely violated, just as law loses its bindingness through desuetude. Th us, increasing the legitimacy of a rule is said to increase the likelihood that it will be respected in the policy choices of states, which motivates the search for strategies of legitimation which might cause this to happen .
Legitimacy and the rules on torture: the US case
Th e laws on torture however do not fi t this model. Th e rules apparently have a high degree of legitimacy in both the objective and subjective senses, and yet their near universal acceptance by states as rules that represent the "good" has not produced universal compliance. Many states that have accepted either or both of these treaties have nonetheless used torture in violation of their commitments. Torture remains an option that is used with some frequency by governments and their agents. It can be found in almost all settings of political power -it appears in the practice of all kinds of regimes, including democracies and dictatorships, and it is used in the pursuit of all kinds of political objectives, foreign policy, domestic, and other.
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Of course, this is no diff erent than many other international rules, perhaps all rules: we expect some degree of noncompliance by the parties. Th e question of interest in this article is how the apparent rule-breaking relates to the apparent legitimacy of the rules. Th e fact of the continuing and extensive practice of torture despite the antitorture legal regime might be evidence that the rules are in fact not seen as legitimate, or that the rules are not consequential, or that legitimation and compliance are distinct concepts without a natural affi nity. Th is section pursues this third possibility -I suggest that international rules such as those on torture do gain power by being widely seen as legitimate but that this power cannot be gauged by its contribution to rule-following or compliance. Noncompliance of a type can coexist with legitimated rules without undermining the concept of legitimacy. Th e key is to take a more sophisticated approach to the relationship between agents and structures in social settings.
Th e tension between rule and practice in this case is notable for many reasons. Most importantly, the failure to forgo torture is a compelling humanitarian catastrophe for the victims and a political and legal disaster for the perpetrators (Center for Victims of Torture 2006 ). It also points to important questions about the weakness of international treaties and enforcement (Hathaway 2007 ) . For the present article, I am interested in the relationship that it reveals between legitimacy and noncompliance. What does it mean for the politics of legitimation that a rule so apparently well legitimated is also violated at a nontrivial rate? Th e US government under George W. Bush consistently maintained its claim to compliance with international law on torture. Mr. Bush famously said in 2005 "we do not torture. " By way of explanation, he suggested that "there's an enemy that lurks and plots and plans to hurt America again. And so, you bet we will aggressively pursue them. But we will do so under the law" (Bush 2005 ) . Th is refl ects a deep-seated commitment to the idea of the rule of law in world politics, and to an important self-perception that US foreign-policy interests are naturally aligned with the demands of the rule of law. Similar claims to inherent rule-following are evident in other areas of US international policy, including the legality of killing Osama bin Laden (Holder 2011 ) , the ban on aggressive war (Hurd 2011a ) , and the use of robots in war (ASIL 2010 ) . In all these cases, the state appears certain of the legality of its behavior and provides an explanation for how the relevant international rules are coincident with its underlying interests.
Th e tenure of George W. Bush as president of the United States is oft en characterized as being indiff erent or hostile to the rules of international law, of "lawlessness" and of perpetrating an "attack on international law" or the "dramatic rejection of international legal constraints" (Liese 2009 ; Sands 2008 ; Slaughter 2008 ) . And concomitantly, many have interpreted Barack Obama's presidency as including a "return" to international cooperation and international law (for instance, Kelly 2009 ). With respect to torture specifi cally, the Bush administration enacted policies regarding interrogation of prisoners in blatant violation of its international legal commitments.
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It did this in secret at fi rst, but continued under new political and legal justifi cations once it was exposed (Forsythe 2011 ; Mayer 2008 ) . Th ere is little doubt that these actions, and perhaps the policy-making that backed them up, constituted grave breaches of the Geneva Convention (assuming the USA was in a condition of war or armed confl ict) and violations of the Convention Against Torture, meaning that those who approved and executed them put themselves in legal jeopardy under the war crimes provisions of the US criminal code and other US statutes.
However, it is equally true that the Bush administration invested heavily in explaining its behavior, and it used the existing international laws on torture as the framing around which it construed these explanations (Bradley 2009 ). Th ese arguments have been widely rejected as legally unsound, but they are signifi cant in the politics of legitimation of international human rights. Th e investment made in situating US policy within the law shows that the international legal architecture on human rights was indeed important to the Bush administration. Th e gap between law and practice in this case cannot be understood simply as a powerful state choosing to violate rather than comply with the rules. Th e na ï ve distinction between "rules" and "interests" that oft en characterizes debates about international law in IR is not sustainable.
21
Th e case therefore suggests a more nuanced view of the relationship between states, rules, and behavior.
As evidence of US torture became public, the US off ered three kinds of legal arguments to substantiate its claim to rule-compliance: it said, fi rst, that prisoners in US custody did not qualify for the legal protections of the 20 Th is is documented in, among other places, Center for Constitutional Rights ( 2006 ); Forsythe ( 2011 ); Sands ( 2008 ) . As I argue below, the US sought to create ambiguity over whether its actions qualifi ed as torture as a matter of international law; this does not preclude acknowledging the existence of torture as a factual matter. 21 For a classical statement of this distinction, see Keohane ( 1997 ) who posits norm-following as an alternative to interest-following. Th e same instinct to separate interests and norms as motivations for action underlies March & Olsen ( 2008 ) .
antitorture regime set out above; second, that the particular practices of US interrogations, including waterboarding, did not satisfy the standard of "torture" in international and domestic law; and fi nally, that the US constitution allowed the President to supersede international law in extremis . Th ese arguments used the resources of the international legal regime on torture in order to construct explanations and justifi cations for American policy that would reconcile US behavior and the rules. It represents an appeal to international law in general, and a reinvestment in the rules prohibiting torture in particular, done in the service of avoiding legal responsibility for rule-violation. Th e case helps to show in conclusion that the practice of international law is at once constraining on states and irrevocably political. Th e fi rst claim was essentially about jurisdiction, and rested on the argument that the individuals that the USA was holding as a result of its "war on terror" were not of the types described as qualifying for protection under any of the Geneva Conventions. Th is argument was developed by the nownotorious legal team in the Offi ce of Legal Counsel at the Department of Justice in 2002, who wrote advice for the President in January 2002 which the President adopted in February of that year (Bush 2002 ) . It said that confl ict with al-Qaeda was outside the scope of the Geneva Conventions because it was neither inter-state nor noninternational, and so the legal terms in the Th ird Geneva Convention were not relevant to prisoners captured in that confl ict. No American behavior toward these people could violate the rules because the individuals were not within the jurisdiction of the rules. Further, it argued that while the war in Afghanistan was within the terms of the Th ird Convention, individuals fi ghting against the USA there did not qualify as prisoners of war under the Convention -they were not organized as a militia, with uniforms and command structure, and they did not themselves abide by the laws of war, said the USA (Bradley 2009 : 63) . To accommodate both sets of people, then the US created the new category of "illegal enemy combatant. " It understood this new category as excluded from both the Geneva Convention protections guaranteed to combatants in inter-state war and those guaranteed to "irregulars" and fi ghters in noninternational wars. Th ere was therefore no legal requirement, they said, to follow any particular course of protection for their rights.
Th e second claim arose from close readings of the Convention Against Torture, the US Criminal Code, and other regulative documents on torture. Th e argument here was that the behaviors of interest to the USA, including beating, waterboarding, mock execution, and animal threats, were not encompassed by the term "torture" in these legal instruments. Th e content of "torture" was instead said to be limited to those acts which produce pain "equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily functions, or even death, " or produce mental harm that persists for months (Bybee 2002 ) . At the same time, the US took the view that to qualify as torture, the torturer had to "have the intent to infl ict severe pain or suff ering, " as opposed to infl icting pain incidental to the intent to acquire information. For US domestic law, Justice Antonin Scalia of the Supreme Court later off ered the view that these might not constitute violations of the Eighth Amendment either since they were not primarily intended as "punishments" relevant to that Amendment (BBC News 2008 ) . Th us, one by one the behaviors of interest to the USA were identifi ed and excluded from operative legal defi nitions of torture for US personnel, and then bundled under the heading of "enhanced interrogation techniques. "
Finally, the administration maintained that under some circumstances the US President was not bound by the international legal commitments taken on by the United States. Th e Bybee memo suggested that the President was essentially unregulated by Congress or by international law in his commander-in-chief duties such that the treatment of detainees in the "war on terror" was at his discretion (Bybee 2002 ; Yoo 2006 ). 22 Th is also applied, it said, to the behaviors of subordinates to the President who were acting on his instructions. Th e constitutional position of the President relative to other legal institutions meant that the torture prohibitions were not constraints on his authority nor on the behavior of his agents. Th is has generated a great deal of discussion among scholars of US constitutional law, overwhelmingly critical (for instance Koh 2006 ) . However, its function in the political debates over torture was to fi nd space within the rule of law where that which was banned by the rules could be practiced without violating them .
Each of the arguments has met with fi erce criticism in the USA and elsewhere. Each fails in the face of either logic or law, and none is currently the operative position of the US government. But this does not mean they are unimportant -as Abbott and Snidal note, "legalization entails a specifi c form of discourse, requiring justifi cation and persuasion in terms of applicable rules and pertinent facts" (Abbott & Snidal 2000 : 429) . Th e American government in this case was committed to remaining within the framework of "legalized" politics in this sense. In what follows, I am interested in how these arguments made use of the international regime on torture, and in their cumulative eff ect in the politics of legitimation. Th is is distinct from the legal persuasiveness of the arguments themselves, and shows why we should not dismiss these arguments as merely self-serving gloss on self-evidently illegal behavior. It is true that they constituted selfserving justifi cations overlaid on rule-breaking, but this cannot be used to dismiss their political impact: they have important social consequences precisely because of how they invoke legal resources in the service of political ends.
Th e various legal defenses of torture generated by the Bush administration all present US behavior as consistent with the legal framework of international society. Together, they constitute a pattern in which individuals who are highly motivated to avoid the constraints of international law fi nd it appealing to appear committed to operating within the constraints of international law; this might be a matter of superfi cial strategic calculation, or a deep-seated self-image as a rule-following agent, or some other combination of motivations. Regardless of the motivation, the observable consequence is a stream of rule-following justifi cations around apparently rule-breaking behavior. It constructs new ambiguity about the meaning of compliance within the legitimated norms and institutions of international human rights. Th e US-torture case takes a stark example of apparent noncompliance and sees in it the pervasive power of rule-compliance and a generalized rule-of-law ideology.
. Implications
Th ree things are evident in the practice of the United States toward torture under George Bush.
First, it is clear that the leading voices in the Bush administration wanted US offi cials to be unlimited in their freedom to treat the prisoners as they wanted (Sands 2008 ; Scharf 2009 ). Th ey were highly motivated to use physical violence against people under their control. But they also appear to have believed that this desire could be consistent with the legal framework around the treatment of detainees. Th ey endorsed the prohibition on torture at the same time that they wanted US torture to be legal.
Th e international laws on torture gave them the tools to construct a legal space within the antitorture regime in which torture would be legal. Th e laws were being used as an instrument to insulate behavior from legal responsibility, in reverse of how law is usually understood. Th e more conventional model of the rule of law suggests that the law defi nes acceptable behavior and that actors should (though may not) modify their conduct to suit. In the torture case, the meaning of compliance was shaped around the policy -I argue elsewhere that this is in fact the normal condition for the rule of law in world politics (for instance , Hurd 2011a and 2012 ) . Th e torture case supports the point made by Scott Veitch, that law organizes irresponsibility for harm as much as it does responsibility for harm. It "facilitate[s] the dispersals and disavowals of responsibility that together may be seen to constitute the practices of irresponsibility" (Veitch 2007 : 3) . Th e law in the torture case was used to create categories that insulated behavior from legal responsibility. Th is may well have been in part motivated by the desire to protect the decision-makers themselves and others from criminal liability in the USA or elsewhere -the legal justifi cations were preemptive in that they could answer any later complaint about criminal behavior. Th ey were also intended to place US foreign policy and national interests within the frame of rule-following for international politics.
Second, it shows the pervasive power of the rule of law as an ideology in international aff airs. Th e idea that foreign policy is and should be organized according to known rules is a central piece of the narrative of contemporary international politics. For but one example, Barack Obama said in his Nobel speech, "Where force is necessary, we have a moral and strategic interest in binding ourselves to certain rules of conduct … [E]ven as we confront a vicious adversary that abides by no rules … the United States of America must remain a standard bearer in the conduct of war. Th at is what makes us diff erent from those whom we fi ght. Th at is the source of our strength" (Obama 2009 ). John Ikenberry has argued that the post-WWII international order is characterized by its commitment to international rules rather than bare power politics: it is a rules-based system, a fundamental change from previous eras (Ikenberry 2011 ) .
Th e rule of law rests on the idea that the rules are fi xed and known, and can therefore be used to diff erentiate between lawful and unlawful conduct (for instance Tamanaha 2007 ) . Its premise is that the gap between rule-following and rule-breaking is knowable, either because it can be read directly from the rules themselves or because it is authoritatively decided by a judicial institution. Knowing that gap then makes it possible to make judgments about the behaviors of actors: the rule of law is what makes it possible for Madeleine Albright, among others, to distinguish "law-abiding" countries from "rogue states" and "terrorists" (Albright 1997 ) .
Th e torture case provides an example of a situation where the diff erence between compliance and noncompliance is not knowable in the way that is necessary for the rule of law idea to work in its traditional form. In this case, and in other instances where the diff erence between compliance and noncompliance is contested in international relations, all actors can unite around the importance of rule-following and all can claim their own behavior as compliant, but the rules are insuffi cient to resolve the diff erences over these claims. Th e rules themselves may be thoroughly legitimated and may have been internalized by a wide range of states, and yet state behavior may frequently not match the rules. Th e "problem" in such cases is not an insuffi cient amount of legitimation or socialization, 23 nor the triumph of "interests" over "norms" (for instance Guzman 2008 ) , but instead the fact that the legitimation of the rules does not in itself imply or create consensus over the meaning of compliance. States do not agree on what constitutes a violation of the rules and the system of international law is not able to resolve their disagreements. Th e study of international law needs therefore to consider the impact of law outside of the "compliance" paradigm.
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States continue to invest in showing that they are complying with the rules rather than violating them. Th ey appear to believe that there are social rewards from rule-following, and this suggests that the rules are powerful even when the meaning of compliance is contested. Th e rules on torture have evident power over states, and their legitimacy is fundamental to that power, but neither the power of the rules nor the diff erence that legitimation makes can be assessed by examining compliance by states because it is the meaning of compliance that the parties are arguing over. Instead, the legitimacy of the rules is evident in how states explain and understand their behavior. It shapes the justifi cations that states make about themselves and their interests. Th is is a signifi cant manifestation of legal power, distinct from debates over the meaning of compliance.
Th is leads to the third implication, which deals with the issue of what international law is for. Th e standard answer is that it distinguishes rightful conduct from forbidden conduct, as suggested by the rule of law model in domestic legal theory (Bingham 2010 ; Chesterman 2008 ; Tamanaha 2008 ) . Th is view is traditional in IR and international legal scholarship (for instance Hafner-Burton, Victor, & Lupu 2011 ) , and in this spirit Hedley Bull said that the job of the international lawyer is to "state what the rules of international law are" to her government (Bull 1977 : 150) . Th is may be possible in settings where there exist institutions that provide defi nitive rulings on rule-breaking and rule-following, for instance in a dispute heard by the International Court of Justice where the court's decision is decisive.
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But it cannot be the case for the antitorture regime, and many other questions of international law, where disagreements about the meaning of legal terms will not be decided by a competent authority. In such settings, the parties will disagree on the meaning of compliance and their interpretations are inseparable from their preferences over the substance of the dispute. Th e strategic use of international law as a legitimating device is likely to occur wherever powerful political interests intersect with the categories of international law and there are no authoritative judicial institutions with jurisdiction to resolve confl icts. Th e list of substantive disputes that have this feature is long -for instance: debates over the legality of the use of force, either for self-defense or for humanitarian purposes (Hurd 2011a ) ; the self-serving eff orts by the USA to construct a legal regime that will permit its practice of using aerial drones against individuals; 26 the competing arguments around the legal eff ects, if any, of the doctrine Responsibility to Protect (Bellamy, Davies, & Glanville 2010 ) . In these cases, disparate elements of law and of state practice are advanced by competing activists in support of their positions, all pursuing the legitimation that comes from being seen as compliant with international law. Th ese practices show the importance that states attach to compliance with their legal obligations, and at the same time show that disagreement will be endemic over the meaning of compliance, the interpretation of state behavior, and the connection between the two.
Th e public nature of international legal resources means that claims regarding compliance by a state are met by counter claims also built from these resources. For most disputes, there is no authoritative body to reconcile them and so the diplomatic interaction over it does not produce greater consensus over the rules.
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Th e literature on argumentation and persuasion 25 Th is does not require that we believe that the court resolves all ambiguity -clearly that is not possible. All it requires is that the court be in an institutional position of authority to provide interpretations of legal questions that are legally fi nal. 26 See for instance Mazzetti (2012) and the subsequent debate at www.lawfareblog.com/tag/ mark-mazzetti/ . 27 Hurd ( 2011b ) argues that international diplomacy consists of competing legal arguments that do not necessarily lead to consensus.
through law tends to assume that these interactions will contribute to reducing the amount of disagreement over the question.
28
Th e process of deliberation and discussion is a problem-solving device, it is said, because it causes the parties to narrow their diff erences. Th e torture case contradicts this assumption, both in practice and in theory: in practice, it shows how a great deal of high-stakes diplomacy can go on around a legal controversy without the underlying issues being resolved, and the importance of the process is not contingent on the development of a consensus over the matter; in theory, the case shows how the USA used legal argumentation as an instrument to legitimate a highly controversial policy, and its strategy depended on the availability of competing interpretations of the law. Neither in practice nor in theory is a consensus over the core question the logical outcome of the process.
Th e role of international law must be understood without presuming a consensus over the content of "compliance" and "noncompliance. " In this vein, Peter Lindseth has said of EU law that "the very nature of public law has itself deeply evolved. It has become less a system of rules marking seemingly clear lines between 'valid' and 'invalid' exercises of authority, as classical understandings of … the rule of law might have demanded. Instead, public law has evolved toward something more focused on 'the allocation of burdens of reason-giving, ' or … 'accountability' " (Lindseth 2010 : 21-22) . Th e role of international law is best described in terms from Harold Koh: "by imposing constraints on government action, law legitimates and gives credibility to government action" (Koh 2010 ) . Law legitimates, even if we can't agree on its content.
Th e instrumental use of law is analogous to how "science" is oft en used as a political instrument in environmental politics. Charlotte Epstein, for instance, has argued that controversies over whale hunting are oft en fought on the terrain of claims about science at the International Whaling Commission. Th e pro-and anti-whaling members of the IWC reach for data on whale stocks and movement as resources to construct justifi cations for their policies. Both sides behave as if "the provision of perfect scientifi c knowledge will resolve all remaining disagreements, because it will unequivocally reveal the appropriate, rational course of action with regard to a natural resource and the environment at large" (Epstein 2008 ; Hurd 2012 ) . In Epstein's case, science is a tool in the politics of legitimation, much like law is a tool to justify or criticize behavior around the 28 See for instance Johnstone ( 2011 ) , following Habermas. antitorture regime. Both law and science can be powerful legitimating devices when they are put to work in defense of a political position.
Conclusions
In this paper I use recent American behavior around the rules on torture to examine the politics of legitimation. In doing so, I contribute to a better understanding of the relationship between international law, human rights, and legitimation. When the USA was breaking the rules on torture, it also did two other things: it claimed that it was not breaking the rules, and it provided an interpretation of international law with which it sought to substantiate its claims. Th e fi rst reaffi rmed its commitment to the rule of law in world politics in general and the importance of compliance in specifi c, while the second argued that terms of compliance with the rule on torture should be understood in such a way that US behavior was not a violation. International law in this case was a tool used in legitimation contests among political actors. All sides claimed to be operating within the international rule of law, and this caused their disagreement to be framed as a fi ght over the meaning of compliance. Th e case shows why legitimacy cannot be equated to compliance -since compliance is essentially contestedand how the distance between the two concepts makes it possible to see the political power that is carried by the instrumental use of international law.
Th e behavioral output of a legitimated human-rights treaty is not necessarily respect for its substantive terms. Th is is at one level a depressing conclusion, since it means that the strategies of legitimation argued over by activists and scholars may not be reliable devices for improving the situation of those who might become victims in the future. However, it sustains the view that the laws are indeed powerful, even over powerful states and over nonaccountable leaders -the need to justify oneself according to the rules makes those leaders dependent on those rules and on their self-serving legal arguments about compliance. Th is dependence makes them vulnerable. Th eir arguments can be met with counter-arguments drawn from the same resources, and the political (and legal) costs of being seen to lose this argument can be high. Where there exist institutions to organize this accountability, such as the ICC or national criminal courts willing to claim jurisdiction, the practical life of international rules can be compelling on individuals. Th is is not impeded by the fact that even welllegitimated rules contain within them the possibility of endless competing interpretations of compliance and noncompliance.
